a brief account on Zoe..
Life, bios or zoe in ancient Greek, is commonly seen as an attribute of our time of existence on Earth in the bodies our souls inhabit. Life, as the time spent in the material world we know, occupying a space and having different sorts of interactions with our environment (such as experiencing pleasure or pain). What we know as being a-live, is what we can perceive as being such according to the characteristics commonly agreed upon; thus, what is alive or what is, is more easily identifiable then what is not alive or what is not alive according to those obvious characteristics.
“The comprehension and conception of the states of the separate soul are extremely difficult and at variance with common usage, just as it is difficult to conceive the substances that are not bodies or in bodies” ( Al-Farabi, The Political Regime, p.38).
How can one define something that is not physical, where the rules and principles that apply for the material world don’t apply, where interactions with that non physical environment and its residents don’t follow normatively what we know from life; how to understand pleasure and pain in such a condition?
The afterlife is that place or state whence life continues after termination of the normative life on earth, where the soul is either rested or in torment. It is classically held through the various monotheistic religions that the soul survives the body after death, and will be in a state consequent to its virtue or vice, explained by theologians as a sort of physical place – infernus or paradeisos – the first being a “low place” where the damned souls endure violent sufferings after death as a punishment for their impurity; the latter , etymologically means “garden”, is the place of rest of virtuous souls after death, where the state enjoyed by those souls is the highest degree of happiness. Three Islamic philosophers have a different explanation of what the afterlife is and how it deals with the issue of reward and punishment.
Al-Razi deals with pleasure and pain as to be avoided, as the first leads to the latter almost inevitably, his first conclusion is that any state or place that avoids feeling pain is better than one whence pain is strongly felt ( the Spiritual Physick, p.103).
Avoiding pain is of critical importance to oneself, others and in the afterlife. Al-Razi considers that striving to attain potential physical pleasures will bring pain in the afterlife, thus looking to satisfy a short lived feeling will bring much greater pain after death; for pleasures of the soul in the afterlife outweigh any bodily or sensible pleasure on earth. From this point on, Al-Razi configures an understanding of what the afterlife brings (Intellectual Autobiography, p.123).
After the death of the material body, Al-Razi imagines a continuity of life for the human soul that somewhat adheres to the more traditional view of the afterlife – one where the souls sensations of pain or pleasure when being punished or rewarded, at the command of God – in the sense that it adheres to the notion of a God that is able to reward or punish souls according to how virtuously or viciously they led their earthly lives, “after death we shall find ourselves in a state that is either admirable or reprehensible according to the life we have lived whilst our souls were associated with our bodies” (Intellectual Autobiography, p.123).
In Al-Razi’s account of the afterlife, “those who deserve to be pained” will suffer some sort of pain, although it clearly differs from the sensation suffered in this world, “since the pleasures and pains of this world come to an end with the end of life itself, whilst the pleasures of the world where no death is are everlasting, unending and infinite, surely that man is demented who would purchase a pleasure which perishes and comes to an end at the price of an everlasting, enduring, unending and infinite pleasure” (p.123).
Al-Razi does not mention quite clearly what kind of pain shall be endured, and how it shall be endured, rather he focuses on the eternal bliss that will be missed by that soul lacking in virtue, and on the notion of a compassionate God that does not take pleasure in the pain humans must suffer, he says: “it is not His pleasure that any pain should befall us; also, that whatever pain befalls us not of our own earning and choice but in accordance with nature is a matter of necessity, whose occurrence is inevitable” (p.124).
A criticism that may be carried against Razi’s account is the question, what happens to those who did not know how to lead a virtuous life? Are they refused eternal bliss on the grounds of ignorance, even they did not willfully choose not to follow the virtuous path?
Al-Farabi has a more precise account on the afterlife than Al-Razi; in accordance with his view on the ideal city and the aim it must look for through the practice of virtue, namely Happiness, he tags existence on earth as “the first life” where humans must prepare for their afterlife (Fusul Al Madani, p.39). According to him, the afterlife is the continuance of the essence sufficient to itself , where it reaches the perfection it was preparing for in the first life, this perfection is Happiness or “the absolute good” (p.39).
In consequence to Farabi’s theory on Happiness which states that it is not open for every man to reach, since happiness can only be attained through the knowledge of the First Principles given by the Active Intellect, “however not every man is equipped by natural disposition to receive the first intelligibles” (The Political Regime, p.35), we may remark that the perfection achieved in the afterlife is restricted to a select few; what is then, the lot reserved to the common people?
The soul, is not destroyed by loss of the body, but finds itself somewhat perfected, sublimated by this freeing from matter (p.38). Moreover, Farabi imagines a happiness that keeps on increasing as more souls unite together “in the way that incorporeal things are together”, the union of these souls will be eternally intellecting and this is constantly increased along with their pleasure as more souls join in (p. 38). This was the account given for those souls who have followed a virtuous first life in preparation for Happiness in their afterlife. On the other hand, “when the activities of the citizens of a city are not directed toward happiness, they lead them to acquire bad states of the soul – just as when the activities of the art of writing are badly performed, they produce bad writing, and similarly, when the activities of any art are badly performed, they produce in the soul bad states, corresponding to the badly performed art. As a result their souls become sick” (p.38, last paragraph).
For these sick souls, the punishment they will endure in the afterlife is not a physical one, in contrast with the traditional view of what is commonly called “inferno” and clearly different of Al Razi’s account, Farabi says about them, that they will “remain chained to matter and do not reach that perfection by which they can separate from matter, so that when the matter ceases to exist they too will cease to exist” (p.39). The soul perishes when its too attached to material things, passions and not enough virtuous, it is tormented with its own desires; as the things that used to bring it pleasure on earth, will bring pain when the soul is separated. A critique to Farabi’s view, is the fate of these people living in the ideal city but who were not predisposed to understand the first intelligibles and thus not predisposed to achieve happiness, if the road of eternal pleasure in uniting intellect is not for everyone, then why should they lead such a life in the ideal city if they have no chance of deliverance of matter?
Perhaps Ibn Sina provides an answer with this explanation of degrees of imperfection.
Ibn Sina discusses the secret of predestination, within this doctrine he says, there is the doctrine that “men’s actions will be rewarded and punished” (Predestination p.38).
In deep contrast with the classical notion of physical sensations of reward or punishment, pleasure or pain in the afterlife, Ibn Sina’s account is a sort of pleasure of the soul that is purely immaterial and more intellectual, this pleasure is in accordance with the degree of perfection the soul has achieved. Similarly, punishment is not perceived as a physical pain endured, but as a degree of pain in the soul according to the degree of imperfection (p.39). Imperfection here is “the state of remoteness from God” (p.39), and the pain suffered in punishment is this distance from the ultimate Good. Reward, is seen as the closeness to God, and perfection with its degrees is related to this closeness (p.39). He sees reward and punishment as a spontaneous effect that arises from one’s soul because of the way it is – according to its degrees of imperfection or perfection.
Ibn Sina does not stop at only giving his account of the afterlife, but also places a thorough criticism of the classically held scholastic definition of this afterlife:
“It is not right to hold that reward and punishment are in accordance with what the scholastic theologians suppose – to acquit the fornicator, for example, by loading him with chains and shackles, to burn him with fire again and again, and to loose snakes and scorpions against him” (p.41).
For he criticizes the way this traditional definition views the afterlife first as a physical place, second as a place for material sensations and pain, third as being a place of torture that God imposes upon those imperfect souls. His critique lies mainly in the fact that God can not possibly be given the attribute of torturer, as he is the Ultimate Good.
We may therefore conclude that there is an evident evolution of the theories on the afterlife, first with Al-Razi, we see an explanation still tainted with the classical understanding of a God that somehow directly rewards or indirectly punishes, where the focus is clearly placed on that blissful state the imperfect souls will be missing.
Then Al Farabi takes it further, and introduces the notion of attachment to matter, and he sees torment of impure souls as their cessation of existence with the termination of matter, as they physically die, their souls too attached to this matter will have the same fate and perish. Ibn Sina even moves further and differentiates his theory by introducing the notion of closeness and remoteness from God; imperfect souls will be punished spontaneously by being far from the Ultimate Perfection, and perfected souls will find pleasure in their closeness to God.
These three different accounts have in common their contrast with the scholastic view of the afterlife, and the explanation of imperfection as the attachment to the material realm.
May 2007.
“The comprehension and conception of the states of the separate soul are extremely difficult and at variance with common usage, just as it is difficult to conceive the substances that are not bodies or in bodies” ( Al-Farabi, The Political Regime, p.38).
How can one define something that is not physical, where the rules and principles that apply for the material world don’t apply, where interactions with that non physical environment and its residents don’t follow normatively what we know from life; how to understand pleasure and pain in such a condition?
The afterlife is that place or state whence life continues after termination of the normative life on earth, where the soul is either rested or in torment. It is classically held through the various monotheistic religions that the soul survives the body after death, and will be in a state consequent to its virtue or vice, explained by theologians as a sort of physical place – infernus or paradeisos – the first being a “low place” where the damned souls endure violent sufferings after death as a punishment for their impurity; the latter , etymologically means “garden”, is the place of rest of virtuous souls after death, where the state enjoyed by those souls is the highest degree of happiness. Three Islamic philosophers have a different explanation of what the afterlife is and how it deals with the issue of reward and punishment.
Al-Razi deals with pleasure and pain as to be avoided, as the first leads to the latter almost inevitably, his first conclusion is that any state or place that avoids feeling pain is better than one whence pain is strongly felt ( the Spiritual Physick, p.103).
Avoiding pain is of critical importance to oneself, others and in the afterlife. Al-Razi considers that striving to attain potential physical pleasures will bring pain in the afterlife, thus looking to satisfy a short lived feeling will bring much greater pain after death; for pleasures of the soul in the afterlife outweigh any bodily or sensible pleasure on earth. From this point on, Al-Razi configures an understanding of what the afterlife brings (Intellectual Autobiography, p.123).
After the death of the material body, Al-Razi imagines a continuity of life for the human soul that somewhat adheres to the more traditional view of the afterlife – one where the souls sensations of pain or pleasure when being punished or rewarded, at the command of God – in the sense that it adheres to the notion of a God that is able to reward or punish souls according to how virtuously or viciously they led their earthly lives, “after death we shall find ourselves in a state that is either admirable or reprehensible according to the life we have lived whilst our souls were associated with our bodies” (Intellectual Autobiography, p.123).
In Al-Razi’s account of the afterlife, “those who deserve to be pained” will suffer some sort of pain, although it clearly differs from the sensation suffered in this world, “since the pleasures and pains of this world come to an end with the end of life itself, whilst the pleasures of the world where no death is are everlasting, unending and infinite, surely that man is demented who would purchase a pleasure which perishes and comes to an end at the price of an everlasting, enduring, unending and infinite pleasure” (p.123).
Al-Razi does not mention quite clearly what kind of pain shall be endured, and how it shall be endured, rather he focuses on the eternal bliss that will be missed by that soul lacking in virtue, and on the notion of a compassionate God that does not take pleasure in the pain humans must suffer, he says: “it is not His pleasure that any pain should befall us; also, that whatever pain befalls us not of our own earning and choice but in accordance with nature is a matter of necessity, whose occurrence is inevitable” (p.124).
A criticism that may be carried against Razi’s account is the question, what happens to those who did not know how to lead a virtuous life? Are they refused eternal bliss on the grounds of ignorance, even they did not willfully choose not to follow the virtuous path?
Al-Farabi has a more precise account on the afterlife than Al-Razi; in accordance with his view on the ideal city and the aim it must look for through the practice of virtue, namely Happiness, he tags existence on earth as “the first life” where humans must prepare for their afterlife (Fusul Al Madani, p.39). According to him, the afterlife is the continuance of the essence sufficient to itself , where it reaches the perfection it was preparing for in the first life, this perfection is Happiness or “the absolute good” (p.39).
In consequence to Farabi’s theory on Happiness which states that it is not open for every man to reach, since happiness can only be attained through the knowledge of the First Principles given by the Active Intellect, “however not every man is equipped by natural disposition to receive the first intelligibles” (The Political Regime, p.35), we may remark that the perfection achieved in the afterlife is restricted to a select few; what is then, the lot reserved to the common people?
The soul, is not destroyed by loss of the body, but finds itself somewhat perfected, sublimated by this freeing from matter (p.38). Moreover, Farabi imagines a happiness that keeps on increasing as more souls unite together “in the way that incorporeal things are together”, the union of these souls will be eternally intellecting and this is constantly increased along with their pleasure as more souls join in (p. 38). This was the account given for those souls who have followed a virtuous first life in preparation for Happiness in their afterlife. On the other hand, “when the activities of the citizens of a city are not directed toward happiness, they lead them to acquire bad states of the soul – just as when the activities of the art of writing are badly performed, they produce bad writing, and similarly, when the activities of any art are badly performed, they produce in the soul bad states, corresponding to the badly performed art. As a result their souls become sick” (p.38, last paragraph).
For these sick souls, the punishment they will endure in the afterlife is not a physical one, in contrast with the traditional view of what is commonly called “inferno” and clearly different of Al Razi’s account, Farabi says about them, that they will “remain chained to matter and do not reach that perfection by which they can separate from matter, so that when the matter ceases to exist they too will cease to exist” (p.39). The soul perishes when its too attached to material things, passions and not enough virtuous, it is tormented with its own desires; as the things that used to bring it pleasure on earth, will bring pain when the soul is separated. A critique to Farabi’s view, is the fate of these people living in the ideal city but who were not predisposed to understand the first intelligibles and thus not predisposed to achieve happiness, if the road of eternal pleasure in uniting intellect is not for everyone, then why should they lead such a life in the ideal city if they have no chance of deliverance of matter?
Perhaps Ibn Sina provides an answer with this explanation of degrees of imperfection.
Ibn Sina discusses the secret of predestination, within this doctrine he says, there is the doctrine that “men’s actions will be rewarded and punished” (Predestination p.38).
In deep contrast with the classical notion of physical sensations of reward or punishment, pleasure or pain in the afterlife, Ibn Sina’s account is a sort of pleasure of the soul that is purely immaterial and more intellectual, this pleasure is in accordance with the degree of perfection the soul has achieved. Similarly, punishment is not perceived as a physical pain endured, but as a degree of pain in the soul according to the degree of imperfection (p.39). Imperfection here is “the state of remoteness from God” (p.39), and the pain suffered in punishment is this distance from the ultimate Good. Reward, is seen as the closeness to God, and perfection with its degrees is related to this closeness (p.39). He sees reward and punishment as a spontaneous effect that arises from one’s soul because of the way it is – according to its degrees of imperfection or perfection.
Ibn Sina does not stop at only giving his account of the afterlife, but also places a thorough criticism of the classically held scholastic definition of this afterlife:
“It is not right to hold that reward and punishment are in accordance with what the scholastic theologians suppose – to acquit the fornicator, for example, by loading him with chains and shackles, to burn him with fire again and again, and to loose snakes and scorpions against him” (p.41).
For he criticizes the way this traditional definition views the afterlife first as a physical place, second as a place for material sensations and pain, third as being a place of torture that God imposes upon those imperfect souls. His critique lies mainly in the fact that God can not possibly be given the attribute of torturer, as he is the Ultimate Good.
We may therefore conclude that there is an evident evolution of the theories on the afterlife, first with Al-Razi, we see an explanation still tainted with the classical understanding of a God that somehow directly rewards or indirectly punishes, where the focus is clearly placed on that blissful state the imperfect souls will be missing.
Then Al Farabi takes it further, and introduces the notion of attachment to matter, and he sees torment of impure souls as their cessation of existence with the termination of matter, as they physically die, their souls too attached to this matter will have the same fate and perish. Ibn Sina even moves further and differentiates his theory by introducing the notion of closeness and remoteness from God; imperfect souls will be punished spontaneously by being far from the Ultimate Perfection, and perfected souls will find pleasure in their closeness to God.
These three different accounts have in common their contrast with the scholastic view of the afterlife, and the explanation of imperfection as the attachment to the material realm.
May 2007.
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